Data Ownership, Privacy Laws, and Trust in the Age of AI | Security Boulevard Ep. 18

Welcome to Security Boulevard, the cybersecurity podcast from The Future Room Group. Each episode explores a variety of topics within cybersecurity and the technologies that drive it. com, the Security Boulevard, YouTube channel, Textron tv, and all of your favorite podcast platforms.

Let's jump into today's episode by meeting our hosts joining me as always, Mr. Mitch Ashley. Mitch, it's good to see you.

Happy February. Hey, happy February everybody. Mitch Ashley m I'm with Futurum also, and I lead the software lifecycle engineering practice, software security, all kinds of good stuff.

So good to be here, as always, Tom. And joining us today is a friend of mine and a very special co-host, and I'll let her introduce herself. Claudia, I'm not so good at introducing.

So, uh, I'm Zoe Rose. I have a very long title. You can look on LinkedIn because I'm not gonna say the alphabet soup out, but essentially I manage security operations for Canon, uh, Europe.

And my name is Tom Howorth. I am the event lead for all things related to security at Tech Field Day, which is a part of the Futurum Group. So let's jump into today's episode.

One of the things that has created some consternation with people is this idea of digital sovereignty and who owns your data. And the answer unfortunately, sometimes is, it depends because it really depends on where your data is housed, where your company's headquarters are located, and a bunch of other factors. And one of the things that brought this up, because I wanted to talk about it, was a news story that I saw a couple weeks ago that the FBI in the us um, asked Microsoft for the encryption keys for some encrypted data that was being stored on their Azure services.

And Microsoft's response was, sure thing, guys, and sent over those encryption keys so that that data can be decrypted for an investigation. And for some people in the US I'm sure that the answer is, well, yeah, that's what the FBI does. And for some people overseas in Europe, maybe Germany, the answer is, boss, no, I don't even know if that was the right article, but we'll go with it.

Um, that to me, that is kind of the highlight of what we're dealing with here, is when things were different and like there was literal physical papers stored everywhere. The sovereignty of those papers was very interesting to figure out because like if they're stored in an embassy vault, that embassy vault is the sovereign territory of that country, and you can't go in and get those, it doesn't matter if you have a warrant or some kind of, um, permission to do that. But now that they're being stored in the cloud, is that cloud owned by the company that owns the cloud?

Is it owned by the organization whose data center space they're renting? And it just so happens that one of our guests today is a non-US resident. So we're gonna get some really interesting perspectives on this.

So I wanna open the floor up to the both of you. Um, how do we get, how do we deal with these sticky situations? Because what if the organization that was storing that data in Microsoft Azure was an non-US entity?

Are they bound by the rules of Microsoft in Washington? Are they bound by the us? Are they bound by their home country?

How do we sort this out? So your guest go right ahead. First.

First, sir. I'm just gonna clarify. I'm not a data privacy expert, so I am making it up as I go along, basically, but, um, but it does, the comment, it depends is so key here because there's a lot of difficulties when it comes to the us.

Um, and I'm not trying to be political or anything. I mean, in the sense of the US has a, a rule, it's like a, I don't know what it's called, but uh, I should have probably Googled it before I came on. But, um, it's, it's if the organization, from my understanding, again, making it up as I go along from my understanding, if the organization where the data is, um, uh, the organization itself, it's, if it's headquartered in America, it doesn't matter where it's stored.

So if you are a US company, but you have a EU based branch, the data's still considered us and so therefore the US governments could still request access to it. Um, I think if you're a US citizen, maybe there's differences there as well. I don't really know that one.

And then when it comes to hosting, um, well, we already see from the Microsoft one, I would not put my bet in the case that if there's any American touch, that it wouldn't necessarily fall under fire with them. And I'm not trying to imply anything there, but it would not necessarily fall to the point where it wouldn't be shared. Um, so I make the assumption, um, we all know what assumptions are, but anyway, I would make the assumption that, um, if I have a connection to the US in any matter that, um, there is the impact that potentially a government could request it.

I do know working in Canada, I know I don't sound Canadian, but many years ago I worked in Canada, um, and we would get requests from, um, uh, law enforcement in the US for certain types of data. Um, one of my clients was an ISP, and we would get requests quite continuously from the us which we didn't at the time have to comply with for some reason. Um, but with that, um, Microsoft one, clearly, I don't know if they had to comply or if they just wanted to, You know, I I may be confusing different, uh, situations, but I think this Microsoft one was, they didn't even have a court order to ask for it.

They just asked for it, and Microsoft gave it up. If I'm inaccurate about that, I apologize, but I think that was another layer on top of this is there wasn't even a force, you know, behind asking for it. Just we asked for it.

It, you know, with, with data sovereignty there, it brings up all these issues about, well, what about data residency? Where does the data live? If it's in the cloud or if it's not in the cloud and then accessing it, does that constitute a transfer of that data even though it's still living over there and, and in whatever sovereign environment?

And I think we're, if we, if we aren't there already, I think we're in for a pretty much a patchwork of regulations of who says what? Brazil says this, Argentina says that, you know, uh, China says this, US Europe, eu, EU tends to, to have one set of regulations for the most part. But I think that's the confusing factor here is can the average IT network security admin engineer figure out this?

It's not as simple as GDPR, not saying GDPR simple. No, but, but I think what's worth highlighting is I'm not a data privacy expert. I am a security expert, debatable, but I'm considered one.

But I have data pri privacy team members and data privacy officers and data privacy champions that I go to and say, here's what I want. Does this meet our requirement? We have policies, we have processes, we have structure around deciding will this work for us?

We have agreements, we have MSAs, we have contracts, all of this in deciding is this solution or this solution the better route? And sometimes it comes down to where it's hosted and where is it stored. Um, because data privacy is just as important as security.

I mean, okay, well if I'm a security person, maybe I shouldn't say that, but it is very, very important, um, ultimately because I can patch it and keep it as secure as they want. But if unknown people accessing it for their own reasons, I've got a, I've got a, uh, security incident, So lemme throw a little monkey wrench into this problem because this is another one of those blurred lines things. The data that I'm talking about in this particular story was stored on three laptops.

So it was completely offline. What happened was, if you've ever encrypted anything in BitLocker, uh, which is Microsoft's version of full dis encryption, one of the things that Microsoft encourages you to do is to upload those BitLocker keys to Microsoft. So in the event that you forget the bit key or you get locked out or something like that, you can call Microsoft, provide information, and they'll decrypt the, the information for you in your head.

That's a great idea, right? What happens if I forget the password to my laptop and I'm locked outta it? But then the flip side of that is if there's a court order to get that information, because you won't provide it for whatever reason, they can go around you and decrypt the, the files off of those laptops.

So, and if I remember correctly, it wasn't just, um, in this case, maybe it was through laptops, but it wasn't just a, if you are end user or a personal person, a personal person in your personal life uploading cloud, it's also the structure of if you're at a corporate environment and they get you to store it so that it can be restored, it it, so it's a broader impact than just personal devices. Because One of the other things that BitLocker allows you to do is upload your encryption key to active directory. And an active directory admin can decrypt it.

So it could be that if you're storing data on a corporate laptop, the law enforcement officers can request your BitLocker key from your administrator. You might not even know that your encryption key has been produced because there's, there's no way that you would know that. And then that gets into all these messy things of, well, you know, were you using a laptop for anything personal?

Was it all professional? What kind of liability is the business being opened up to if you're doing illegal things on a company owned asset? Well, I, it also goes down to it's not just company owned.

So if you are doing company work on a personal phone, like if you've got your work phone and your, you know, your work phone and your mobile phone, your personal phone, but you're doing work activities on your work phone and your personal phone, they could then access both of those, couldn't they? Like, it's, it gets it's very complex. Well, and I think this is where, you know, there's the cloud act that us put in place.

It's, you know, involves That's what was Trying to, to talk about. Yeah. Yeah.

You have to go through the FSA courts supposedly to get access to it. Um, but there's of course, the, I think the data privacy falls under GDPR maybe, maybe as part of the AI act. Everything is AI these days, so that may change things as well.

But, you know, accessing this information, we're talking about people accessing it most times could be applications, but now we're talking about agents and ai, of course, not to turn this into the AI security podcast, but that could very much change things of where things operate and where they're allowed to operate. And is there a sovereign agent that can access sovereign data? Uh, what if that sovereign agent can go find the encryption keys that were stored on an unencrypted drive?

Or What if it's a double agent? What if it's a double agent? Well, what if we go to the Verizon data breach every year, the report that they make?

Um, one of the top categories is not highly sophisticated attackers. It's misconfiguration. So not only if you're bringing in ai, what, what if you accidentally give access to things you're not supposed to, which I imagine that's happening all the time that we don't even Realize.

Can you say mobo, the new CC Bot? It's not MOBO anymore. It's, it's changed, it's open claw now, because again, it's Open c Claude, oh boy, I missed it this weekend.

Yeah, if anybody's been keeping track of this, you're gonna listen to two back to back episodes of the podcast. And that tool changed its name three times in the time that those two episodes are recorded. But, but that kind of comes back to that whole, what am I dumping from these devices without realizing that I've opened up these permissions?

Because in the case of Claude bot, molt, bot Open, Claude, whatever we're calling it this week, um, you give it access to be able to read your chats, whether it's Slack or iMessage or anything like that. And iMessage is actually a really interesting kind of pivot point here, because this is something that was brought up in the discussion about what happened with these three Guam laptops. Uh, apple has their own version of, uh, disc encryption software, uh, file Vault.

They can't recover a file vault like it, it is specifically designed iMessage file Vault. All of their systems are so designed so that they even, they can't get into it. And we've seen this time, and again, because people have asked Apple to, uh, to open up someone's, uh, encrypted into, into iMessages to be able to do whatever, and Apple says, no, we can't do it.

And when a company even suggests that they're gonna sue Apple to do it, then Apple meets them in court. And in one particular case with a, uh, uh, something that happened in the US several years ago with an iPhone five C, the government quietly dropped their request to have Apple decrypt the iMessage, and Apple immediately turned around and sued the government to find out how they were able to get in. Uh, and that's how we learned about things like gray boxes and stuff like that.

So the, the question, this, this is something that Senator Ron Wyden from the US brought up, is if Apple and, and he mentioned meta as well, if they can encrypt things end to end with no visibility into what the, the people are talking about, how come other companies either can't or won't do that? Because to me, using a, a program say like Signal, which is not only encrypted end to end, but the signal people can't even get into it if something were to happen, I, I would rather have that than, oh, I guess I forgot my key. Oh, I, you know, that could be bad for me.

No, what's bad for me is when someone with access chooses to abuse that access, because they can, I'm a security person. I'm not comfortable with an organization choosing who has rights to my, my data. And if you attack me for saying, oh, you shouldn't be worried because you have nothing to hide, I do have something to hide because I'm a person and I have a right to my privacy.

Everyone has a right to their privacy. I, however, am a technical person. I know how to do things to the best of my ability.

I make mistakes, but I learn from them. I've taken things offline, I've learned from it. I'm not the average user.

So I think there's both sides to the argument. I'm gonna say it depends again, because from a Microsoft perspective, they want to, they, they're designed for the enterprise. They're designed to ensure availability.

You know, they, they want, if a user locks themself out, if a company has issues, they're designed to try and give that data back. I get why they set it up that way. Um, from a signal perspective, yeah, they design it so that nobody could take it over that that's their whole, the whole point of them, right?

From a, if you remember a couple years ago when we had the security field day and keeper, um, keeper security, the password manager was presenting on their zero knowledge concept of if you can't access, well we can't help you because we don't have access. There's no way for us to decrypt it. That is the goal, that is the design of the product.

I get why this whole Microsoft situation happens. But I think that organizations and end users and you know, both the professional and personal have a right to understand what the impact is. Um, and years ago, I had a colleague who's a privacy lawyer and she worked hard with an organization to rewrite terms and conditions on social media platforms so that children could understand it.

I think in my perspective is organizations should have the responsibility to be extremely clear here is the privacy impact of your data. Because yes, we say yes or no to cookies. Yes, we say yes or no to, um, marketing companies.

But where in there does it say, do you realize if you do this, I could give your data to somebody else that you would've no idea? I do. I feel like that should, that responsibility should exist.

Or that's Buried on page 23 of the EULA you clicked on. That's, yeah, That it shouldn't be buried. It should be clear, it should be transparent.

I live in the eu, so I'm very pro data privacy. I do know a lot of organizations are not as much that way. It's plain Language.

Sorry, go ahead, Tom. I was just gonna say it's a plain language problem that we've run into with it for years, right? In it, we know how to describe something and understand what it does and security in the same way, but normal people don't understand that.

Think of all of the, the prompts, the system prompts that you get now on your mobile device. When an app needs permissions, you know, this app can read your email. Well, I don't know that I wanted to read my email.

Well, if you want it to be able to categorize your email, it has to be able to read it, right? Or this app needs access to Bluetooth devices. Well, I don't want it to do that until you wanna like stream something to your tv Or you say, Right?

And, and that's the thing, some of the most successful apps that this say in very clear language, we need to access your phone records because we need to know this, or we need to understand that and we'll never use it for these things. And you know, like that kind of thing. The more clear they are, the better off we all feel about it.

But I feel like in some cases, the, the organizations that want access to be able to get into these systems, they, they want to be purposefully obfuscating it. Like, oh, well we, we just need to be able to get into people's iMessages at some point in the future, maybe for reasons, but we're not gonna tell you why, because that would be wrong. But it also has, it also has the reality of, um, yeah, okay, the comment I made earlier, I have nothing to hide, therefore I shouldn't be concerned.

Well, okay, but maybe I don't have an issue with Tom accessing my email. I don't have an issue handing Tom my phone because I trust Tom. However, if Tom is replaced with somebody else, I'm gonna pick on you because you're on the other one here.

But he's replaced with Mitch. I'm not okay with that. I'm not giving Mitch my phone.

I Wouldn't give me your phone if that was you. Well, you know, But when things change as well, I mean that, that impact you're Talking about that circle of trust, right, Zoe? And, and I, I don't, I, I can't speak to Signal and their process, but, and I'm not saying Apple does everything.

You're right. I can criticize Apple, I want all I want, but even Apple has recovery or reset mechanisms that aren't just, it isn't a one shot key. And if you don't have that key, you're out.

Right? Um, but it's part of an ecosystem of your identity. And like you were talking about Tom, you have to validate on a separate device.

Yeah, I'm, that's me. I'm allowed, okay, there's a number there. I have to type in from that app.

Um, I may have to do, uh, do another authorization through a, you know, authentication app, uh, with a code, those kinds of things. I went through that procedure not too long ago to recover password on a machine. I didn't know what it was anymore from way back.

Um, but that was, you know, apple couldn't do that for me. I had to do it, but they gave me the instructions to do it. It seemed like that's the, whether you're an enterprise or an individual, Zoe, to your point about, you know, they have different interests, you know, even the enterprise should be able to recover those accounts.

Um, let's say when you left and you didn't have the right key loaded up into active directory, now the company has to recover. There are mechanism should be mechanisms to do that when it's company owned data as well as when it's personal owned. I can, I can actually speak to this because I, I can't remember if it was the phone that I have now, or the phone that I had previously.

I had a bit of a, an issue with it. So for everyone who knows, like, you know, Google basically you at Attach, you can si I have permissions attached to a Google account, right? So like the Google account that I use in my daily life also has permissions to be able to post videos on the technical day YouTube channel, it's a thing.

Well, when I switched phones, I needed to log into that account. And in order to do that, the way that Google works now is if you have another device that's logged into a Google account, you can send a two-factor code to it, right? Apple works the same way, but the devices that it was wanting me to send those codes to didn't exist anymore.

Like two of the three of them didn't. And the third one was my old phone. And try as I might, I couldn't get it to do a password reset.

I couldn't get it to do like text me a code because it would pop up and say, um, you know, a, a more secure method exists. I actually ended up having to boot up my old phone and, and pull the thing off it, which is why kids, you should never erase your device until you know that every app works. Mm-hmm.

But in, in my frustration of this, right, because it was like an hour process of me trying and failing so many ways, I'm like, oh my God, how come this isn't easier? And then in a little, in the back of my head, something said, because it shouldn't be this easy for someone that's not you to be able to get into your device. And that I think is the thing kind of to Zoe's point the whole, well, if you, if you don't have anything to hide, why won't you let us look?

Um, okay, cool. Every executive board member at the company now has all of their emails open for everybody to read. Are you horrified by that idea?

You're a publicly traded company. Everything on your device should be available to read because you're, you're in the public interest. Do you see now how that presumption of guilt, if you don't let me look at things, causes problems.

What if now instead of it me being a shareholder, what if it's a government entity? Because you know, what happens when someone, someone announces that a government entity is investigating a company share price goes down even if there's nothing wrong. And kind of circling back to our original comment, you know, Zoe, to your point, you know, if, if your company is headquartered in the US then there's the presumption that the FBI has jurisdiction to get your data.

But if that data's stored in the UK and if you're doing business with, uh, or not uk, but if you're, if let's say France, if you're data stored in France and you're doing business with French customers, GDPR supersedes everything. And we know that because we've seen people get fined for it. And I remember when GDPR rolled out, and I had to attest that I wasn't doing business with companies there in order to prevent me from having to deal with all this GDPR stuff.

And that's the thing is like what ultimate superseding regulation works. Like, you know, this isn't like the Martian where it's like, you know, according to the law of the ocean, I'm a pirate kind of thing. And this is my ship now.

Like, like this is trying to find the loophole that lets you get out of this scot free. Because inevitably someone at some point, whether it's a u the US Supreme Court or I don't know the I CCC or, or the eus equivalent of the Supreme Court is gonna come back and go, actually no, that was illegal. And now you can't use any of that in your court case.

Uh, interesting, interesting analogy is, uh, I'm a data pirate in a salvaged data found, you know, in in the open that nobody had. Even now that's mine. I own that.

But to your, to your, to your example Tom, is there's a difference between I have a core order, I'm looking for this data, right? So usually that request comes from send all this data that you have and and mm-hmm. And corporations are send All this data Oversubscribed That related to this specific thing.

Exactly. That is an important thing that we have to note. A warrant is not a fishing expedition.

And I'm talking about a judicial warrant. That's my point Point. I also wanna add, I also wanna add, I have seen some of these and I have seen some that have given way broader access than they should because the person that signed off didn't know what they were signing off for.

And, And this is, this, judges have this problem. But what, when you get into like younger judges that are technically savvy, they're usually like, you were only allowed to look for text messages on this specific dates between these people related to this item. And you cannot use anything you find to charge additional crimes because that's fruit of the poison tree.

Yes, I watch law and order, but, but you know, continue your point, Mitch. You know, I just wanna make sure that everybody home understands warrants are not phishing expeditions. Right?

Well, and that I think the, the, the one sort of get outta jail free card, if that's a good analogy, is FISA court national security. That can be, that tends to be very broad, at least from the things I've seen because once you put that label on it, you know, they, they wanna be able to go lots of places. Now maybe judges restrict that more, but, um, that, that seems to me to be the concern.

If you can make everything a national security issue, now I can go fishing all I want. Yeah, yeah. And na not only that, but usually if it goes Nats sec, like it's classified at that point, so you're not even allowed to notify the target or any of them are related to them.

And that's one of the things that we've run into in the past is that people were like with a FIA court warrant, they could have their phones wiretap and they would never know because you're not allowed to notify the target or anyone related to them. And it's only years later that it comes out. You're like, wait a minute, how long have you been collecting the phone records from me?

Like, and, and for anybody that's old enough to remember, like, we had this problem back in the seventies, right when they were trying to bust the five families in New York City. It's like, we're just gonna wiretap every phone they own and, and we're gonna collect all this data and, and we're just, we're just looking for stuff. If you ever wanted to know why gangsters talking code in the movies, that's why is because they always assume that someone was listening to their conversations and they had to make it sound like this was a thing that was happening that really wasn't.

And now what do we have? We have people that can go in and dump your entire email account and just, you know, control f and look for a word or look for a code word and oh, look what I found here. And, and that to me is the ultimate problem that we deal with with digital sovereignty is that if you have the ability to decrypt data at rest by requesting file vault keys or, or BitLocker keys or whatever, you effectively have created a time bomb.

Because all I have to do is get ahold of your data, decrypt it, pass it through any kind of a filtering system and just go fishing. And also we're a, you know, I got security because I don't trust people. Um, I had to learn to like people, I'm not even kidding.

I had to learn to like people and I had to learn to trust people. Um, ultimately I still don't, um, to a point I trust Tom, I trust you. You're, you're, you're, you're loud.

But uh, unless you call me randomly and you appear slightly random, then I would suspect your ai. But regardless, um, I don't trust people ultimately, I don't trust organizations. Um, I'm just a number to any of them.

I know that I'm not a fancy important person. Um, so ultimately when I choose a product that I use, I know that eventually it could theoretically be used against me, which is why I go for the products that prioritize my privacy and my control in a corporate environment. I don't have, well, okay, I'm an exception.

I work security. So as an end user I might ha not have that authority. But in my personal life, I should theoretically.

So ultimately we are dependent on organizations designing things in a secure way, like keeper with a zero, uh, knowledge, um, like, uh, apple where they don't want or don't have the ability to decrypt. I'm not saying those, those companies are perfect at all. Um, I'm saying though that we look at, when I look for products, I look at ones that have the same mindset as me to a point, obviously.

And when I look at data privacy, um, in my unexpert opinion on there, um, I do look at minimizing where the conflicts can come up. So if I'm hosting data somewhere, my priority is going to be Germany or the eu, it's not gonna do America. No offense Tom, but it's not gonna be there.

I am going to prioritize that you, because of our privacy regulations. I just say if you design your systems to meet Germany's privacy laws and their security regulations, you're gonna be good everywhere else in the, in the world because, And that's what organizations do typically. We say, for example, my organization is Europe wide, it's EMEA, right?

Um, well, but it's very, very big. We have a lot of different privacy regulations, a lot of different regulations in general, lots of rules. And so we design for the most strict, um, I imagine in America or the US they do similar because you have state changes and weird things there.

So I imagine you also design for the most stringent, We kind of have the federal and then California, there's like two tiers pretty much. Fair enough. It tends to be the, well, that's More than one factors.

Yeah, there is more than one. Everything else is, is kind of random from that point on. But to your point, So I think we, we kind of hit a, a wrapping point here.

When we talk about the, the challenges that are faced with the digital sovereignty kind of in general is you've gotta, to Zoe's point, I don't trust people, but I trust an individual person when they've proven themselves trustworthy. And corporations are nothing but collections of people. And so what we have to do is we have to decide, am I willing to put my faith in a system of people that I don't know, or would I feel more comfortable knowing that there are technological barriers in place to prevent those people from becoming a person that I don't trust?

And for me, kinda like Zoe said, I would rather trust people who have shown that they are willing to put the best interests of an unknown user ahead of their own financial or in some cases legal challenges. And I'm gonna continue to use those companies. I'm gonna continue to, you know, purchase products from organizations that feel like they have privacy at heart.

I'm gonna continue to donate to projects that are increasing the, uh, overall security of people. And I'm going to choose not to use products that have shown that they would rather make a quick buck off of me. And, you know, I'll sell your information.

I don't care. I wanna thank both of you for joining us this week because this has been a great discussion. Uh, Mitch, I know that you're a super busy man with all this stuff going on with future and group.

Uh, what have you got going on that people should be checking out? Well, the newest thing on my project list is to get to spend a little more time with Zoe, so she'll start to trust me. But besides that, which is an important thing, um, besides that, we're just, we just launched a new dataset for our, around software delivery, software development, uh, also including using ai, but also not inclu using ai, really comprehensive data.

And so I'm doing a lot of things with that and writing reports, um, getting pieces of that out there that I think are the most meaningful around, like, for example, and not, probably not surprised to everyone, but 97% of organizations are either using AI for software development or evaluating. I think it's only 20% we're evaluating. 1% haven't gotten AI religion yet.

It's, it's happened that fast. And, and, and at the beginning of last year it was in the 40% range. That's how fast we've adopted this.

Um, whether it's secure or not, it probably makes all of this cringe from a security standpoint. And also gearing up for conference season, there's a number of conferences coming up that'll be out, but I'll have a post on LinkedIn just to follow me at, so you can see what things I'm producing and where I'll be in. I love to meet, I love to meet and see everybody.

And Zoe, I know that you have some amazing stuff that people should check out. Where can people go to learn more about some of the things that are of interest to you? com or on LinkedIn.

I, I'm also on Blue Sky. Um, I have removed my X Accounts, um, for various reasons, but, um, yeah, those are my two most three, I said three things. Those are my three most active.

Um, but yeah, right now conferences and being a mum is my main five sketch. I just, I, I had a, a, like I was getting flashbacks to the, uh, Spanish Inquisition sketch. You know, our primary weapon is fear, our primary weapons, our three primary weapons.

But that's, but that's how it is. And, and of course, you know, the Spanish Inquisition, they were security people because you didn't expect them to show up. Um, as for me, we have a lot of great stuff going on.

Uh, as we're recording this, we just finished AI Infrastructure Field Day and, uh, we've got Cloud Field Day coming up with Alistair Cook. I'm gonna be on the road at RSAC this year, uh, doing Tech Field Day Extra. We've got some great companies that are signed up.

If you wanna check out Tech Field daycom for more information on that, we invite you to do so. But we also wanna thank you for listening to this episode of Security Boulevard podcast. If you enjoyed this conversation, do us a favor and make sure that you're subscribed on YouTube and, uh, maybe even subscribe to us in your favorite podcast application of choice.

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